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ABSTRACT 
Background: Nosocomial norovirus infections and their control measures disrupt patient care, increase 
staff workload and raise healthcare costs.  
 
Objective: To determine the impact on outbreaks of nosocomial viral gastroenteritis, staff and patients 
affected, and bed closures of a multidimensional quality improvement (QI) initiative focused on 
education; improved patient surveillance; early automated recognition and notification of infection of 
index patients; and proactive care and control measures. 
 
Methods: In a pragmatic, retrospective, observational study, we compared numbers of 
suspected/confirmed norovirus outbreaks at Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust (PHT) with regional and 
national data, before and after a multidimensional QI initiative. We also compared mean daily bed 
closures due to norovirus-like symptoms. At PHT only we recorded patient and staff numbers with 
norovirus-like symptoms, and days of disruption due to outbreaks. 
 
Results: Annual outbreak numbers fell between 2009-2010 and 2010-2014 by 91% at PHT, compared 
to 15% and 28% for Wessex and England, respectively. After April 2010, recorded outbreaks were 8 
(PHT), 383 (Wessex) and 5063 (England). For the winter periods from 2010/2011 to 2013/2014, total 
bed closures due to norovirus were 38 (PHT; mean 0.5 per week), 3565 (Wessex hospitals; mean 48.8 
per hospital per week) and 2730 (England; mean 37.4 per hospital per week). At PHT, patients affected 
by norovirus-like symptoms fell by 92%, affected staff by 81% and days of disruption by 88%.  
 
Conclusions: A multi-year QI programme, including use of real-time electronic identification of 
patients with norovirus-like symptoms, and an early robust response to suspected infection, resulted in 
virtual elimination of outbreaks. The ability to identify index cases of infection early facilitates prompt 
action to prevent ongoing transmission and appears to be a crucial intervention. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Norovirus is the most common cause of epidemic gastroenteritis.1-4 Outbreaks of hospital-acquired 
norovirus infection occur frequently, especially in winter.4-6 Predisposing factors include: patient-staff 
and patient-patient contact; frequent inter-ward transfers; poor environmental and staff hygiene; high 
bed occupancy rates; and staff movement within the hospital.7-9 As different staff look after different 
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patients, even within the same ward, outbreak recognition is often delayed. 
 
In hospital, norovirus control measures focus on breaking the chain of transmission through: rigorous 
hand hygiene; environmental cleaning and disinfection of contaminated surfaces; isolating suspected 
and confirmed cases, and their contacts; limiting staff movement between infected and non-infected 
areas; and restriction of visitors.6-8 Norovirus infections and their control measures disrupt patient care, 
increase staff workload and raise healthcare costs.4,10-12 Public Health England (PHE) has reported that, 
on average, outbreaks are associated with 13,000 patients and 3,400 staff becoming ill, 8,900 days of 
ward closure and the loss of over 15,500 bed-days, annually.4 In one recent UK publication, 192 
outbreaks cost an estimated £1.2 million.11  
 
Since 2008, Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust (PHT) has introduced interventions to improve patient 
surveillance, accelerate identification of patients with norovirus-like symptoms, and ensure appropriate 
proactive management (Table 1). To measure their impact on outbreaks, we undertook a retrospective 
analysis and compared the results with contemporaneous national and regional data.  
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Table 1: The multidimensional quality improvement initiative 
 
Intervention 
(Implementation date) 
Description of Intervention Intervention 
type 
Rationale 
A 
(May 2008) 
‘Stop the bugs’ campaign. Education Local infection prevention initiative to increase hand hygiene and 
reduce transmission by faecal-oral route. 
B 
(From late 2008) 
Extended IPCT working hours. Staffing Provide a comprehensive reactive service modelled on patient need. 
 IPCT staff trained to assess risk; obtain a clinical history; 
perform a physical examination; and provide proactive 
clinical management to stabilize vulnerable patients and 
minimize symptoms. 
Education Differentiation of infectious / non-infectious symptomatic patients. 
Reduction in patient morbidity. Reduction and source control to reduce 
environmental contamination and patient-to-patient transmission. 
 Emphasis on single-room isolation; and identification and 
removal of the index case 
Space Removal of index source and reservoir. 
 Ward hand hygiene audits and peer review of hand hygiene 
compliance  
Audit Reduce direct and indirect transmission through faeco-oral route 
 Out-of-hours outbreak management transferred to IPCT Staffing Proactive (often onsite) cover out-of-hours by infection prevention 
specialist to manage ‘suspected’ outbreaks. 
 Whole ward measures for enhanced cleaning, with special 
emphasis on touch point cleaning. Detergent & hypochlorite 
preparation used for cleaning all suitable surfaces. 
Environmental  Reduce bio burden in ward environment and reduce direct and indirect 
transmission. 
 Drinking water jugs emptied and washed in a dishwasher; 
Replenish regularly with fresh water; clean drinking 
fountains. 
Environmental  Source control of water as a possible vector for Norovirus. 
 
 Opened patient and staff food discarded. Beverage bays 
cleaned. Microwaves and fridges cleaned. 
Environmental  Reduce transmission via contaminated food. 
 
 IPCT visits at least twice daily. Ward ‘attack’ rate 
monitored. 
 
Staffing Monitor success of interventions, up scale or downgrade as required 
 
 Staff and patients information leaflets distributed. Education Inform on control measures to enlist greater compliance with outbreak 
measures. 
 Additional healthcare support worker employed. Staffing Provide ward staff and patients with IPCT support 
C 
(June 2009) 
New hospital block opens Space Increase in the number of single use occupancy, newer environment 
easier to clean.  
D 
(April 2010) 
IPC-Manager Software Information 
system 
Timely electronic surveillance of suspected cases of viral 
gastroenteritis. 
 
IPCT = Infection and Prevention Control Team; IPC Manager = Infection Prevention & Control Manager
 5 
METHODS 
Ethical Committee Approval 
Ethical Committee Approval for this study is covered by Isle of Wight, Portsmouth and South East 
Hampshire Research Ethics Committee study ref. 08/02/1394. 
 
Setting 
The pragmatic, retrospective, observational study took place at PHT, an NHS Trust providing clinical 
services during the study period at five hospitals (Queen Alexandra Hospital (QAH), St. Mary’s 
Hospital, Royal Hospital Haslar, Gosport War Memorial Hospital and Petersfield Community 
Hospital). PHT has ~7,000 staff, and admits ~140,000 patients annually to ~1000 inpatient beds. It 
provides all acute services except burns, spinal injury, neurosurgical and cardiothoracic surgery to a 
population of ~540,000. The study covers the period 1st September 2006-31st March 2014. 
 
Pre-intervention practice regarding norovirus infection  
Prior to winter 2008, PHT had no proactive, systematic norovirus infection surveillance. Ward staff 
reported clusters of symptomatic patients to the hospital’s Infection and Prevention Control Team 
(IPCT) via telephone, often resulting in inaccuracies and delay. The IPCT investigated and managed 
outbreaks Monday-Friday 09:00-17:00; on-call microbiologists provided cover at other times. Outbreak 
confirmation was often made only by telephone. If necessary, infected wards were closed to 
admissions, transfers and discharges, thereby restricting staff, patient and visitor movement. 
Environmental cleaning was undertaken with hypochlorite. Symptomatic patients were frequently 
distributed across an affected clinical area; little effort was made to cohort or contain them. A 
philosophy of allowing episodes to ‘burn out’ existed. Wards were monitored once daily and re-opened 
72h after the last symptomatic patient. A ‘bare below the elbows’ policy and emphasis on hand 
washing were already in place. 13,14 
 
Intervention: multidimensional quality improvement (QI) initiative 
Introduction of a public health education campaign (Table 1, intervention A) 
In May 2008, PHT introduced ‘Stop the Bugs’, a public health education campaign to prevent hospital 
infections through hand hygiene awareness,15 employing: adverts on bus shelters, buses and billboards; 
a dedicated website; and media publicity. Posters, leaflets and alcohol gel dispensers were placed 
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throughout PHT.   
 
Targeted norovirus care and control bundle (Table 1, intervention B) 
Prior to winter 2008, core IPCT working hours were extended to 07:00-18:00 Monday-Friday, and out-
of-hours outbreak management was transferred to on-call IPCT staff. Processes for reporting 
symptomatic patients remained unchanged, but telephone management alone was replaced by IPCT 
visits to every affected clinical area on day one of an outbreak. IPCT staff focused on two aspects; 
identification of infectious symptomatic patients, and measures to break the chain of transmission. 
Clinical assessment training was introduced for all IPCT nurses, enabling them to identify/exclude 
infections and manage them confidently. Ward hand hygiene audits were introduced and staff behavior 
regarding infection control, e.g. personal protective equipment usage, was monitored. 
 
More assertive enhanced cleaning of outbreak areas was introduced, focusing on the whole ward. 
Domestic and clinical staff were trained to focus on cleaning key ‘touch point’ areas, as well as the 
general ward environment.  All opened patient or staff food and drinks in affected areas were 
discarded; water jugs and cups were emptied, washed in a dishwasher and replenished with fresh 
supplies. An IPCT nurse specialist reviewed symptomatic patients, focusing on fluid and electrolyte 
balance, hypotension, and diarrhoea management. There was now an emphasis on removing 
symptomatic patients and protecting surrounding ones within six hours of a case being reported. 
Grouping of symptomatic patients was avoided, unless viral gastroenteritis was confirmed 
microbiologically. Ward closure was only contemplated if the ward ‘attack rate’ indicated uncontrolled 
norovirus transmission. Patient discharge home or to institutions capable of continuing effective 
isolation was permitted. A healthcare support worker was employed to aid rapid implementation of 
control measures (e.g., removing excess clinical equipment and patients’ belongings; ensuring adequate 
supplies of disposable items), deliver patient and family education, and provide an early semi-
permanent IPCT presence in outbreak areas. Information leaflets were disseminated to patients, visitors 
and staff.   
 
Opening of a new hospital block (Table 1, intervention C).  
In June 2009, a new 79,000m2 hospital block opened at QAH, providing additional single-occupancy 
side rooms and greater space between beds.  
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Introduction of software designed to identify patients with norovirus-like symptoms in real-time (Table 
1, intervention D). 
In April 2010, the IPCT and The Learning Clinic (TLC) Ltd., London developed and introduced a 
computer application - VitalPAC Infection Prevention & Control Manager (IPC Manager) – to enable 
early identification of patients with norovirus-like symptoms. IPC Manager extends an existing 
hospital-wide electronic vital signs system (VitalPAC),16,17 that enables nurses to record routine patient 
observations at the bedside on handheld devices. The handheld devices connect wirelessly to a hospital 
database server, where patient administration system and laboratory data are automatically integrated to 
create safety alerts. All vital signs, laboratory results and derived data are viewable throughout the 
hospital using mobile devices or desktop computers linked to the hospital intranet.16 Of significance to 
the early identification of possible norovirus infection, each time vital signs are recorded VitalPAC 
directs staff to enter whether patients have nausea, vomiting or diarrhoea. VitalPAC uses an electronic 
version of the Bristol Stool Chart to facilitate easy entry of data regarding stool consistency. 
 
IPC Manager integrates with VitalPAC, using automatically generated real-time feeds from 
microbiology reporting systems and submitted routine nursing observations to enable IPCT members to 
view the location, and clinical and infection status, of all patients instantaneously using handheld 
devices. IPC Manager also creates real-time alerts to the IPCT if observations suggest an index case or 
emerging outbreak, thereby enabling rapid intervention to prevent infection spread. IPCT staff can also 
record details of the infection control management of individual patients (e.g., isolation, suppression) 
or wards (i.e. closed/open) using IPC Manager.  
 
Evaluation 
Definitions 
Norovirus infection was suspected if any of the following occurred within a 24h period in a single 
patient: >2 episodes of vomiting of suspected infectious cause; >2 loose stools; or >1 episodes of both 
symptoms.18 Confirmed norovirus infection required laboratory confirmation of infection.18 
 
A suspected norovirus outbreak was defined as >2 patients with suspected norovirus infection 
occurring on a ward.18 A confirmed norovirus outbreak required microbiological confirmation.18 
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Outbreaks in different clinical areas were treated as separate events.   
 
The outbreak duration was defined as the period (days) from onset to completion. Outbreaks were 
considered over when there had been no new cases for seven days in the clinical area.18,19 The duration 
of disruption was defined as the number of days during which a clinical area was ‘closed’ or under 
‘special’ infection control measures.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
For the period 1st September 2006-31st May 2014, we obtained the following data from PHT’s 
IPCT records: (1) number and duration of suspected/confirmed norovirus outbreaks; (2) number 
of individual patients and staff with norovirus-like symptoms; and (3) number of days of 
disruption due to outbreaks. All of these are measures of the impact of the intervention, 
mediated via the impact of norovirus. Additionally, to reflect norovirus activity in the local 
community, we obtained the number of positive laboratory reports (from hospital and 
community requests) from the PHT microbiology laboratory records.  
 
For comparison with PHT, we obtained data from PHE’s hospital norovirus outbreak reporting system 
(HNORS)20 for the number of (I) laboratory reports of norovirus and (II) suspected/confirmed 
norovirus outbreaks for (i) all English NHS hospitals and community settings, and (ii) 11 health 
providers in the Wessex Region - seven acute NHS Trusts (NHST) and NHS Foundation Trusts 
(NHSFT) (Appendix 1). Data were available for laboratory reports from 1st September 2006-31st May 
2014, but for outbreaks from only 1st January 2009-31st May 2014 (HNORS was not launched until 
January 2009). 
 
We calculated the percentage change between 2009/10 and the mean for 2010-2014, in numbers of 
positive laboratory reports and outbreaks for PHT, Wessex and England, and for affected patients, 
affected staff and days of disruption at PHT. We used a negative binomial regression model to 
calculate the incident rate ratio (IRR), in order to quantify the combined impact of: the ‘Stop the Bugs’ 
campaign and the targeted norovirus care and control bundle (comparing event rates in 2008/09 and 
2007/08); the additional side rooms (comparing rates in 2009/10 and 2008/09); and IPC Manager 
(comparing the mean rate between 2010/11 and 2013/14 with that in 2009/10). We did not calculate 
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IRRs for laboratory reports, as these reflect a combination of community and hospital samples and are, 
of limited value in determining changes in hospital.  
 
To identify the number of unavailable hospital beds due to norovirus-like symptoms, we compared the 
mandatory daily Winter Pressures Situation Report (SITREP) data21 for the winter periods 2010/2011-
2013/2014 for three groups:  (1) 158 acute NHS Trusts in England; (2) the eight acute NHSTs/NHSFTs 
in the former NHS South Central Strategic Health Authority (SCSHA), other than PHT (Appendix 2); 
and (3) PHT alone. SITREPs have been used annually between early November and February/March 
since 2010/2011.21 To address mergers of Wessex and English hospitals during the study, we used the 
number of Trusts in 2013-2014 when considering ‘per hospital’ data. 
 
Total annual overnight hospital bed occupancy (%) figures for PHT for the study period were 
obtained from the NHS England website.22  
 
RESULTS 
(A) Comparison of PHT with other centres 
The number of suspected/confirmed norovirus outbreaks at PHT, Wessex and England peaked in the 
winter annually (supplementary files 1-3). There was a sudden, sustained fall in outbreaks following 
winter 2009/10 at PHT, but this was not seen in Wessex or England (supplementary files 1-3). 
Comparing the mean annual outbreak numbers from April 2010-March 2014 with those for April-
March 2009/10 demonstrates a 62% decrease in positive laboratory reports and a 91% reduction in 
outbreaks at PHT (Table 2). For the same comparison, positive laboratory reports and outbreaks fell by 
only 26% and 15%, respectively, in Wessex and 30% and 28%, respectively, in England (Table 2). 
 
The fall in the outbreak incident rate between April-March 2009/10 and the period April 2010-March 
2014 was significant at PHT (IRR, 0.095 [0.042-0.215]), but not in the hospitals in the Wessex (IRR, 
0.854 [0.435-1.676]) or England (IRR, 0.724 [0.412-1.272]) groups.  
 
After April 2010, there were only eight outbreaks (mean two per year) at PHT, compared with 383 in 
Wessex (mean 95.8 per year) and 5063 for England (mean 1265.8 per year) (Table 2).  
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Table 2: Annual numbers of positive laboratory reports and outbreaks for PHT, Wessex and England. Annual numbers of affected staff, affected 
patients, days of disruption and percentage overnight bed occupancy for PHT. 
 
           
 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14  Mean for 
2010/11 – 2013/14 
% change 
comparing mean 
from April 2010-
March 2014 with 
April–March 
2009/10 
PHT           
positive laboratory reports 56 81 78 23 28 55 13  29.75 -61.9% 
outbreaks 59 31 21 3 2 2 1  2 -90.5% 
affected patients 607 282 218 23 21 17 9  17.5 -92.0% 
affected staff 87 40 54 20 11 8 1  10 -81.4% 
days of disruption 458 177 112 21 19 9 3  13 -88.4% 
bed occupancy (%) 81.1 78.5 83.1 81.0 86.9 88.5 91.2  - - 
           
Wessex           
positive laboratory reports 309 344 283 183 291 201 160  208.75 -26.2% 
outbreaks - - 112 106 147 66 64  95.75 - 14.5% 
           
England           
positive laboratory reports 6192 8148 11588 7998 9023 9552 5948  8130.25 - 29.8% 
outbreaks - - 1746 1182 1605 1528 748  1265.75 - 27.5% 
           
 
Percentage overnight hospital bed occupancy figures for PHT were obtained from KH03 data available on the NHS England website.22 
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For the combined winter periods from 2010/2011 to 2013/2014, the total number of beds closed due to 
norovirus-like symptoms at PHT was 38 (mean 0.5 per reporting week), compared with 3565 per 
Wessex hospital (mean 48.8 per hospital per reporting week) and 2730 per hospital in England (mean 
37.4 per hospital per reporting week) (Figure 1). For PHT, there were only 3/73 weeks (4%) for which 
there were beds closed due to norovirus-like symptoms. 
 
 
(B) Impact of interventions at PHT 
 
Between February 2007 and January 2010, the peak monthly frequency of outbreaks varied between 
eight and 19, but the outbreak pattern was essentially unchanged by the introduction of interventions 
A-C. Figure 2 shows that, during the period when interventions A-C were introduced, annual outbreaks 
fell from 59 to 31 and 21 (April-March 2007/2008, 2008/2009 and 2009/2010). However, intervention 
D (April 2010 onwards) was associated with a greater fall to three, two, two and one in April-March 
2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014, respectively (Table 2).  
 
Similar patterns were seen following the introduction of interventions A-D for patients and staff 
affected, and days of disruption (Figure 2). The number of affected patients fell by 92%, affected staff 
by 81% and the days of disruption by 88% (Table 2) between April 2010 and March 2014. 
Additionally, there were six instances of re-infection in a ward within seven days from April 2007 to 
March 2010, but none between April 2010 and March 2014.  
 
The combined introduction of interventions A (‘Stop the Bugs’) and B (the care/control bundle) was 
followed by significant falls in all outcome metrics. IRRs [95% CIs] for the comparison 2008/09 vs. 
2007/08 were: outbreaks 0.527 [0.341-0.814]; affected patients 0.466 [0.404-0.537]; affected staff 
0.461 [0.317-0.670] and days of disruption 0.388 [0.326-0.461]. The opening of additional side rooms 
(intervention C) was not followed by a significant fall in outbreaks or affected staff, although 
reductions in the number of affected patients and days of disruption were significant. IRRs [95% CIs] 
for the comparison 2009/10 vs. 2008/09 were: outbreaks 0.677 [0.389-1.179]; affected patients 0.773 
[0.648-0.923]; affected staff 1.350 [0.897-2.032] and days of disruption 0.633 [0.499-0.802]. The 
greatest reductions were seen after the introduction of intervention D (IPC Manager). IRRs [95% CIs] 
for the comparison of the mean for 2009/14 vs. 2009/10 were: outbreaks 0.095 [0.042-0.215]; affected 
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patients 0.080 [0.061-0.105]; affected staff 0.185 [0.045-0.769] and days of disruption 0.116 [0.039-
0.349]. 
 
(C) Bed occupancy 
Bed occupancy increased from 81.1% to 91.2% over the study period (Table 2).  
  
DISCUSSION 
In comparison to other hospitals, and despite increasing bed occupancy, PHT experienced a sustained 
reduction in hospital-acquired norovirus outbreaks after introducing a QI initiative, which commenced 
in 2008. Outbreaks were reduced by over 60% between 2007/08 and 2009/10, coinciding with the 
introduction of interventions A-C. In particular, the combined introduction of interventions A (‘Stop 
the Bugs’) and B (the care/control bundle) led to significant falls in all outcome metrics. However, in 
2009/10, there were still 21 outbreaks, affecting 218 patients and 54 staff, and leading to 112 days 
disruption. Early recognition of index patients remained difficult and, by the time they were reported, 
outbreaks typically already involved several patients, and had been in progress for >24h.  
 
In April 2010, IPC Manager (intervention D) was introduced in order to reduce the time from a 
patient’s first symptoms to the IPCT becoming aware and commencing proactive interventions. Its 
introduction was associated with an abrupt and sustained reduction in norovirus outbreaks, affected 
patients, affected staff and days of disruption in the following four years. Instances of re-infection 
disappeared.  
 
Following IPC Manager’s introduction, PHT experienced few winter bed closures due to norovirus-like 
symptoms; quite different to the experience of other study hospitals. Although not measured, the 
implied patient benefit – less patient distress and discomfort; fewer severe or fatal complications23-25 – 
and the estimated financial savings resulting from reduced treatment needs and length of stay10-12 will 
have been significant. 
 
This study has several strengths. It uses national definitions for defining outbreaks and data come from 
national reporting schemes. Positive laboratory report and outbreak data for Wessex and England were 
obtained via PHE’s optional HNORS, but SITREP data are mandatory national returns and are likely to 
 13 
be reliable. Indeed, if anything, laboratory, outbreak and SITREP figures are an underestimate, as over-
report of outbreaks is unlikely. The observed sustained outbreak reduction at PHT has a plausible direct 
relationship to the interventions. Importantly, outbreak incidence was reduced at PHT compared to 
immediately local hospitals (i.e., Wessex), suggesting a hospital-specific effect. Finally, the work was 
done during a period in which norovirus activity appears to be increasing.26,27  
 
However, there are also weaknesses. It is a single-centre, retrospective study: similar results might not 
be replicated elsewhere. Interventions were not introduced in a controlled manner, making 
identification and quantification of individual and relative influences on outbreak reduction difficult. 
HNORS data reporting is optional and hospitals need not make a zero return, making it impossible for 
us to produce ‘per hospital’ outbreak figures for Wessex and England. Another possible confounder is 
the random variation in annual norovirus outbreaks.20 
 
The QI measures that were introduced focus on: (1) staff, patient and visitor education regarding 
norovirus and preventing spread; (2) accurate timely bedside recording of patients’ physiology and 
symptoms; (3) early availability of data facilitating prompt outbreak recognition; (4) automatic and 
real-time notification of high-risk patients to the IPCT; and (5) early IPCT intervention with effective 
infection control measures. None of these components would be sufficient alone to reduce outbreaks to 
the extent that we observed. However, with all other necessary interventions deployed, we postulate 
that IPC Manager provided the final link necessary to prevention infection spread (i.e., early and 
focused identification of index cases). 
 
As noroviruses are highly contagious and have a short incubation period, and patients are most 
contagious when symptomatic,28 the ability to identify index patients as soon as possible after 
symptoms occur is crucial. IPC Manager facilitated rapid mobilization of the IPCT (much earlier than 
via ‘usual’ communication routes), enabling implementation of effective isolation and suppression 
measures, the prevention of cross-infection of patients, staff and visitors, and the avoidance of 
outbreaks. 
 
Nevertheless, IPC Manager is unlikely to have worked without other important QI changes. 
Considerable effort was made to dispel the belief that norovirus outbreaks are inevitable, and to 
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educate staff, patients and visitors about the causes and prevention of norovirus infection, and the need 
for improved social behaviour. These helped to create a common purpose of eliminating norovirus 
infection, which was supported by the hospital board, clinical governance committee and IPCT, who 
emphasised commitment to following evidence-based, national guidance on eliminating norovirus and 
other healthcare associated infections (HCAI). The PHT and TLC staff that designed and developed 
both VitalPAC and IPC Manager provided further innovative leadership. The IPCT showed 
commitment to monitoring of clinical practice (e.g. regular hand-hygiene audits) and outcomes at ward 
level (i.e., norovirus ‘attack’ rates), and to disseminating the results. The increased IPCT presence on 
wards also demonstrated their direct engagement in the initiative to reduce HCAIs. 
 
One QI intervention – additional side rooms and increased bed space29 (intervention C) – did not result 
in a significant independent fall in outbreaks or affected staff, although affected patients and days of 
disruption were reduced. This is probably because moving infected patients to side rooms would 
necessarily reduce the number of days of ward closure, but could not affect the speed of reporting new 
cases to the IPCT. Similarly, although the other interventions implemented before winter 2009/2010 
had a significant impact on all outcome metrics, outbreaks still occurred presumably because they 
failed to speed up the recognition of index patients.  
 
This study re-emphasises the power of suitably designed IT systems to facilitate improved clinical 
outcomes.17 Internet surveillance has been proposed for monitoring infectious disease outbreaks and 
electronic surveillance of HCAI is increasing.4,30.31 However, we believe that our report is the first to 
show reductions in infectious disease following the use of real-time focused alerts sent directly to a 
hospital IPCT using routinely available clinical and laboratory data. 
 
In summary, nosocomial outbreaks of suspected/confirmed norovirus have virtually been eliminated at 
PHT, despite evidence that outbreaks remain a regular problem for many regional and national 
hospitals. This appears to result from combined interventions focused on education, monitoring, early 
automated recognition and notification of infection of index patients, and a prompt response using 
robust infection control measures by the IPCT. Whilst impossible to prove a direct cause-and-effect 
relationship with any individual intervention, there are strong plausible temporal relationships between 
the outbreak reduction, and the events at hospital level. 
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LEGENDS FOR FIGURES 
Figure 1: 
Mean weekly numbers of closed beds at PHT; the eight acute Trusts in the former NHS South 
Central Strategic Health Authority [SHA Q38]; and all 158 acute Trusts in England because of 
norovirus, as reported via Daily Winter Pressures Situation Reports (SITREPs) during winter 
periods 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2013/14. Study weeks refer to fiscal weeks 
 
Figure 2:  
Impact of norovirus outbreaks at PHT, showing the annual number of outbreaks; affected patients; 
affected staff and days of disruption for the period April to March for the years 2007/08 to 
 18 
2013/14. The duration of disruption was defined as the number of days during which a clinical 
area was ‘closed’ or under ‘special’ infection control measures. A = ‘Stop the Bugs’ campaign; B 
= Targeted norovirus care and control bundle; C = New hospital block opened; D = Infection 
Prevention & Control Manager (IPC Manager) implemented. 
 
Supplementary Figure 1:  
 
Number of monthly suspected/confirmed norovirus outbreaks for the period 1st September 2006 to 
31st May 2014 for PHT obtained from Infection and Prevention Control Team records, with major 
infection control interventions marked. A = ‘Stop the Bugs’ campaign; B = Targeted norovirus 
care and control bundle; C = New hospital block opened; D = Infection Prevention & Control 
Manager (IPC Manager) implemented. The outbreak duration was defined as the period (days) 
from onset to completion. Outbreaks were considered over when there had been no new cases for 
seven days in the clinical area. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2:  
Number of monthly suspected/confirmed norovirus outbreaks (1st January 2009 to 31st May 2014) 
obtained from Public Health England for the Wessex group of seven acute hospitals and four 
community Trusts that manage hospitals. The outbreak duration was defined as the period (days) 
from onset to completion. Outbreaks were considered over when there had been no new cases for 
seven days in the clinical area. 
 
Supplementary Figure 3:  
Number of monthly suspected/confirmed norovirus outbreaks (1st January 2009 to 31st May 2014) 
obtained from Public Health England for the hospitals and community settings in England. The 
outbreak duration was defined as the period (days) from onset to completion. Outbreaks were 
considered over when there had been no new cases for seven days in the clinical area. 
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APPENDIX 1: ELEVEN HEALTH PROVIDERS IN THE WESSEX REGION - SEVEN 
ACUTE NHS TRUSTS AND NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTS  
1. Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust (PHT) 
2. Royal Bournemouth & Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
3. University Hospital Southampton NHS Foundation Trust 
4. Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
5. Dorset County Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
6. Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
7. Isle Of Wight NHS Trust 
8. Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust 
9. Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust 
10. Isle Of Wight NHS Primary Care Trust 
11. Solent NHS Trust 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: EIGHT ACUTE NHS TRUSTS AND NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTS IN THE 
NHS SOUTH CENTRAL STRATEGIC HEALTH AUTHORITY (SCSHA), OTHER THAN 
PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS NHS TRUST 
1. Isle of Wight NHS Trust 
2. Heatherwood and Wexham Park Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
3. Milton Keynes Hospital NHS Trust 
4. University Hospital Southampton NHS Foundation Trust 
5. Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust 
6. Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust  
7. Oxford University Hospitals NHS Trust 
8. Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust 
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